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THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DECISION

The writing on international commercial arbitration often is replete with statements .affirming the necessity and advocating the
progression of the institution.1 Entreaties to foster the collabora* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Eason-Weinmann
Center for Comparative Law, Tulane University. Dipl6me Sup6rieur d'Etudes
Frangaises, Universit6 de Poitiers, 1971; A.B. 1972, Bowdoin College; B.A. 1975,
M.A. 1979, Oxford University; J.D. 1978, M.A. 1979, University of Virginia;
LL.M. 1979, J.S.D. 1984, Columbia University.
1. An exhaustive bibliographic survey of the domestic and foreign literature
on international commercial arbitration would be excessive. Accordingly, a representative sample of sources is given to illustrate the various points made. For a
positive and supportive assessment of international arbitral dispute resolution,
see generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE CO-
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tion of national courts usually supplement analyses of the historical evolution and contemporary status of international arbitral
law. Commentators apparently are reluctant to note or suggest restraints. The consideration of limits on the creative handiwork of
national courts and international merchants might sully the merits of the appraisal or, worse, impede the growth of an institution
destined to advance international commercial interests. Indeed,
the transnational consensus on commercial arbitration is exceptional-a rare example of viable cohesion in the fragmented arena
of international affairs. The unifying spirit of the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention,2 the uniformity of approach among national courts to the implementation of the Convention,3 and naOPERATION (M. Domke ed. 1958); J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979); Aksen, InternationalArbitration-Its Time
Has Arrived, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982); Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977); Kerr,

International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164; McClelland, International Arbitration: A Practical Guide to the System for the Litigation of
Transnational Commercial Disputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 729 (1977). Accord
Rhodes & Sloan, The Pitfalls of International Commercial Arbitration, 17
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1984).

The classical treatments of the subject include: R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1985); P. FOUCHARD, L'ARBrIRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1965); J. ROBERT, L'ARBITRAGE DROIT INTERNE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIV9 (5th ed. 1983); C. SCHMHIrHOFF, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1986); G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1984); de Vries, Inter-

national Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National
Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).

2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 3 codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982) [hereinafter New York
Arbitration Convention]. For a comprehensive scholarly discussion of the Convention, see A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958
(1981). See also Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. J. Comp. L. 283 (1959); Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The
LF4M' 65WY~*§eAeIMM &QoMIb
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3
INT'L L. 320 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Sanders, Consolidated Commentary on Court Decisions on the
New York Convention 1958, 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 231 (1979). See also Aksen, Appli-

cation of the New York Convention by United States Courts, 4 Y.B. COM. ARB.
341. See generally G. GAJA, 1-2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCiAL ARBITRATION: NEw
YORK (1979) CONVENTION (1985).
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tional legislation supportive of the emerging international consensus on arbitration 4 attest to a willingness to eradicate parochial
concerns, to respond to felt needs, and to achieve functional international commercial cooperation. Nationalism may engender

diplomatic incidents and actual warfare, but it should not incapacitate world commerce by depriving international merchants of
the means to resolve their contractual disputes without regard to
their national, jurisdictional, and cultural differences. The sounds
of dissonance have been faint, episodic murmurings about the integrity of domestic public policy concerns, the dire implications of
"anational" arbitration, and the necessity of having local law play
a role in the proceedings.5
The United States officially joined the transnational ranks with
its ratification of the New York Arbitration Convention' in 1970

4. See Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, reprinted in 5 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 239, 23946 (1980). For commentary on the 1979 Act, see, e.g., Hacking, The "Stated
Case" Abolished: The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979, 14 INT'L LAW.
95 (1980); Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 87 (1980); Steyn,
England, 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 3 (1983). See also Decree of May 14, 1980, 1980 JOURNAL OFFICIEL 1238; Decree of May 12, 1981, 1981 JOURNAL OFFICIEL 1402. For
commentary on the French decrees, see, e.g., Audit, A National Codification of
International Commercial Arbitration: The French Decree of May 12, 1981, in
RESOLVING TRANSNATioNAL DisPUTEs THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION at

117 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984) (Sixth Sokol Colloquium); Craig, Park, & Paulsson, French Codification of a Legal Framework for International Commercial
Arbitration: The Decree of May 12, 1981, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727 (1981);
Delaume, InternationalArbitration Under French Law: The Decree of May 12,
1981, ARB. J., March 1982, at 38; Derains, France, 7 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 3 (1982);
Goldman, La nouvelle rgglmentationfrangaise de l'arbitrageinternational,in
THE ART or ARBITRATION 153 (J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982). See also
Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982, Ord. No. 10/82 (Hong Kong), reprinted in W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, ch. 34 (1984).
5. For a discussion of these issues, see P. FOUCHARD, supra note 1, at 330546; Lalive, Les r~gles de conflit de lois appliquges au fond du litige par
l'arbitreinternationalsi~geant en Suisse, 1976 REV. ARB. 155; Mann, Lex Facit
Arbitrum, in

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER ANICoRuM FOR MARTIN DoMKE

157 (P. Sanders ed. 1967); Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 21 (1983); Park & Paulsson, The
Binding Force of InternationalArbitral Awards, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1983);
Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound, 30 INT'L & CoMiP. L.Q. 358 (1981); Paulsson,
Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It
Matters, 32 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 53 (1983).
6. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 2. See Quigley, Accession
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and the United States Supreme Court's 1974 pronouncement in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.7 In Scherk, seemingly inspired by

the incorporation of the Convention into United States law, the
Court began to articulate the more specific contours of a United
States policy toward private international law matters. In Scherk
and prior, like-minded decisions,8 courts viewed international
commercial transactions as beneficial to both the national interest
and the world at large. These transactions constituted a unique
sphere of mercantile activity, distinct from their domestic analogues, and were entitled by their nature to special, less restrictive regulation. Accordingly, an international commercial transaction, although involving a United States party and interests, was
exempt from the reach of some domestic law imperatives.
Since 1925, the Scherk Court emphasized, the United States
had endorsed a policy strongly favoring arbitration; the ratification of the Convention strengthened that policy. Domestic strictures on securities activity, requiring in at least one version of the
relevant legislation recourse to judicial remedies in the event of
dispute, fell in the face of the overriding international policy supporting the recourse to arbitration in international commercial
activity. Although the precise import of the Scherk doctrine
needed further refinement, what formerly had been a fragile and
unanchored international consensus in United States policy, supported primarily by foreign legislation, now was emerging as a
centerpiece of United States law-the seedbed for elaborating a
comprehensive United States policy toward private international
law matters.
by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961); Comment, United Nations ForeignArbitral Awards Convention: United Statei Accession, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67 (1971). See also Czyzak & Sullivan, American
Arbitration Law and the UN Convention, 13 ARB. J. 197 (1958).
7. 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). The textual references to
the Scherk opinion and observations regarding its significance are taken from
Carbonneau, ArbitralAdjudication:A ComparativeAssessment of Its Remedial
and Substantive Status in TransnationalCommerce, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 33, 6874 (1984).
8. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See also
Cowen & Da Costa, The ContractualForum:A ComparativeStudy, 43 CAN. B.
REV. 453 (1965); Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133.
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II.

SEEKING .A MEASURE OF RESTRAINT

The concerns that surfaced in the wake of Scherk centered on
how adequate limits, protective of national interests, might be defined and imposed upon the international arbitral process. Technical considerations pertaining to the exercise of arbitral authority, the validity of the arbitration agreement, and the contractual
capacity of the parties certainly remained elements in the framework for evaluating the lawfulness of the claim to arbitrate.9 Substantive issues also factored into the framework. Whether the
subject matter of claims was arbitrable, for instance, constituted a
principled impediment to arbitration in some circumstances. 10
According to Wilko v. Swan," only judicial tribunals could adjudicate domestic disputes arising under the Securities Act of
1933.12 In both domestic and international matters, despite the
latitude of the Scherk doctrine, courts reasoned that issues relating to the status and capacity of individuals and to antitrust controversies generally could not be submitted to private adjudication13 because the substance of these disputes was anchored in
core public policy considerations. Also, the courts of the requested jurisdiction could den'y recognition or enforcement to foreign arbitral awards under the New York Arbitration Convention
either on grounds
of inarbitrability or for reasons of domestic
14
public policy.

Prior to 1985, at least some substantive limitations on the arbitral resolution of international commercial disputes existed under
United States law. On the one hand, Scherk symbolized United
States allegiance to and participation in the transnational consensus on arbitration, that international commercial ventures needed
to be distanced from purely national concerns and regulated by
national courts in accordance with a transnational standard. Onthe other hand, while the creative interface between national law
and international regulation minimized specifically national concerns, the aegis of the inarbitrability defense and the public policy exception could safeguard fundamental matters of national
9. See New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 2, arts. II(1)-(3), V(1).
10. See id., arts. II(1), V(2)(a).
11. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
13. See G. WiLNER, supra note 1, §§ 10:01, 13:09 (domestic relations), 19:04
(antitrust matters).
14. See New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 2, art. V(2)(a) & (b).
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public interest.
Arbitrability was clearly the more meaningful deterrent to the
possibility of uncontrolled arbitral internationalism and the "anational" effacement of domestic policy interests. Practice indicated
that the public policy exception in the New York Arbitration
Convention was a weak instrument, plagued by the lack of substantive specificity and a general redundancy with other grounds
in the Convention. In the enforcement framework, the public policy exception had a nebulous catch-all character and probably
was included as a stop-gap measure designed to placate abstract
concern about the exceptional case. 15 A fairly wide conceptual
overlap existed between the inarbitrability defense and the public
policy exception: disputes involving public interest matters were
not capable of resolution by arbitration and the enforcement of
awards pertaining to inarbitrable matters would be contrary to
domestic public policy. Except where the public policy exception
was invoked to respond to a failure of basic procedural fairness
(an omission for which other grounds of the Convention also provided), 16 for all practical purposes, inarbitrability and public policy were equivalent means by which to defeat the recourse to arbitration. Arbitrability, however, applied both to the validity of
the agreement and to the award,17 whereas the public policy exception related exclusively to the enforcement of awards.'
HIL.

ARBITRABILITY

Arbitrability, therefore, was the chief source of equipoise in the
otherwise uneven exchange between national juridical interests
and the creation of a transnational arbitral dispute resolution
process. While United States courts were prone to resolve conflicts between the right to have recourse to court litigation and
arbitral adjudication simply by incanting the general federal policy favoring arbitration,"9 arbitrability was a substantive limita-

15. For
DEN BERG,
16. See
17. See

a discussion of the public policy exception to enforcement, see A. VAN
supra note 2, at 376-82.
New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(a)-(c).
id., arts. II(1), V(2)(a).

18. See id., art. V(2)(b).
19. The relevant cases illustrating the point are simply too numerous to list.
See, e.g., Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socift6 G6n~rale De L'Industrie Du Papier, 508
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Delaume, L'arbitrage transnationalet les
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tion upon the reach of arbitral jurisdiction.
In domestic matters, there have been indications, however, that
this traditional bar is being diluted, eroding in areas where courts
formerly have applied it without reservation to disallow private
adjudication.2 0 There is an unmistakable (perhaps irreversible)
trend in United States domestic arbitration law to expand the
substantive jurisdictional scope of arbitration. Legislators tend to
give predominant weight to the principles of party autonomy and
mutuality and to minimize the potential burden upon the court
system by promoting self-determination in dispute resolution.
Legislators also envisage claims touching upon matters of the
public interest as encompassing at least divisible disputes: a nonarbitrable principal dispute and arbitrable ancillary disputes. The
trend in domestic law appears to have reduced considerably the
breadth of the public interest concept.
The factors that contributed to the domestic re-evaluation of
the concept of arbitrability, however, do not have the same presence or force in the area of international adjudication of disputes
through arbitration. 2' Despite a similar need for expertise, ecotribunaux am6ricains, 108 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 788 (1981).
20. For example, while tort claims generally are inarbitrable (they cannot be
foreseen by contract, involve a duty imposed by operation of law, and implicate
public safety and individual corporeal integrity), state legislatures have enacted
statutes providing for the arbitration of medical malpractice. See, e.g., Heintz,
Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Viable Alternative, ARB. J., Dec. 1979, at
12, 15. Courts also have recognized that tort issues arising under a contract containing an arbitration clause may be submitted to arbitration. See, e.g., United
Aircraft International v. Greenlandair, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Conn.), aff'd
410 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1969). Some states allow the arbitration of uninsured motorist accident claims. See G. WI NER, supra note 1, § 13:11 at 204. In 1983,
federal legislation expressly allowed the arbitration of issues involving the validity and infringement of patents - matters previously considered "inherently
unsuited to the procedure of arbitration statutes." See U.S. Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 294; Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 186 (D. Del. 1930). See
also .Carmichael, The Arbitration of Patent Disputes, ARB. J., March 1983, at 3.
While arbitrators can neither perform nor dissolve marriages, arbitration agreements pertaining to nonstatus divorce disputes (child support and custody,
maintenance, property division) have been recognized as binding in separation
agreements. See G. WILNER, supra note 1, § 13:09. Arbitration also has acquired
a role in the settlement of claims arising from decedents' estates. See id. § 13:07.
Moreover, disputes relating to partnership contracts and the dissolution of a
closely-held corporation have been deemed to be arbitrable. See id. § 13:02-03.
21. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between domestic and
international disputes resolution needs, see a previous.study: Carbonneau, Ren-
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nomical and expeditious proceedings, and specialized (and also
neutral) fora, the removal of imperative domestic concerns from
the homogeneity of the national culture and juridical system
would imperil the integrity of such concerns, making a reduction
of the inarbitrability defense untenable. Regardless of how few
areas are included within the purview of inarbitrability, the balancing of policy considerations implied in the adhesion to the international consensus on arbitration should dictate that these domestic imperatives be insulated from the general minimization of
the national interest.
Following Scherk, circumstances involving alleged antitrust violations in an otherwise arbitrable international contractual dispute were a suitable springboard for articulating meaningful national law restraints on "truly international" contracts.2 2 The
United States courts had exhibited tremendous reverence for the
antitrust laws, viewing them as instrumental to the ideological
and economic integrity of the United States and the free world.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)2 3 and its
somewhat subdued progeny, the courts had defied international
comity and upheld the extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust law.24 A refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement or award when antitrust claims were involved, therefore,
would not be inconsonant with other United States international
adjudication and, to some extent, would belie Justice Douglas'
prophecy in Scherk concerning the "'international contract' talisman, 25 allaying fears of unfettered internationalism.

dering Arbitral Awards With Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of
International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 603-05 (1985).
22. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
23. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d
Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdictionand Foreign
Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REV. 925 (1963); Grundman, The New Imperialism:The
ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law, 14 INT'L L. 254 (1980); Kintner & Griffin, JurisdictionOver Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 199 (1977); Comment, Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J.
259 (1960); Recent Developments, Antitrust Law; Extraterritoriality,21 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 515 (1980).

25.

417 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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IV.

THE INITIAL DETERMINATION

The stage was set for a major decision. Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth26 represents the long-awaited
sequel to Scherk. This decision gives additional substance and
definition to the nascent policy on private international law matters, specifies how that larger policy relates to transnational commercial arbitration in particular, and suggests the Court's initial
position on the vexing question of "anational" arbitration. 7
The facts of Mitsubishi fit admirably into the script.2" Soler, an
automobile dealer in Puerto Rico and formerly a franchised
Chrysler dealer, entered into a distributorship agreement with
Chrysler and a separate sales procedure agreement with both
Chrysler and Mitsubishi. The latter agreement contained an arbitration clause stating that disputes arising under the contract
"shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association."2 Mitsubishi was formed as part of a joint venture between Chrysler International, S.A., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Chrysler Corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of the joint venture agreement, Mitsubishi manufactured vehicles for sale through Chrysler
dealers in territories outside the continental United States.
Experiencing a decline in sales, Soler was unable to meet the
agreed minimum in the sales procedure agreement; Soler requested that Mitsubishi withhold the shipment of several orders.
Mitsubishi, however, refused to release Soler from its minimum
sales obligation and held Soler responsible for a shipment of vehicles that it withheld. Soler then sought to minimize its losses by
"transshipping" its stock to the continental United States and
26.

105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).

27. For a discussion of "a national" or "floating" arbitration, see W. CRAMG,
W. PARK, & J. PAULSSON, supra note 4, at Pt. V, § 28.05; A. VAN DEN BERG, supra
note 2, at 28-51.
28. The facts are taken from the Supreme Court opinion: 105 S. Ct. 3346,
3349-52 (1985). For a commentary on the opinion, see Campbell & Vollmer, International Arbitration, 7 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 24; Robert, Une date
dans l'extension de l'arbitrageinternational:L'arret Mitsubishi ci Soler, 1986
REV. ARB. 173. See also Lipner, InternationalAntitrust Laws: To Arbitrate or
Not to Arbitrate, 19 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 395 (1985); Recent Developments, Arbitration: Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims in International Tribunals, 27 HARV.INT'L L.J. 227 (1986).

29. 105 S.Ct. at 3349.
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Latin American countries. Mitsubishi, however, refused to permit
such shipments, claiming that the Soler vehicles were manufactured to meet Puerto Rican specifications and were uisuitable for
use elsewhere.
Before the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Mitsubishi sought an order to compel arbitration. Soler
counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, antitrust violations, namely,
that Mitsubishi's refusal to allow the "transshipment" of its stock
amounted to a trade restriction and a breach of the Sherman Antitrust Act.30 According to Soler, Mitsubishi and Chrysler unlawfully divided markets, and Mitsubishi had in effect engaged in a
boycott and other predatory practices to drive Soler out of business. This allegation and others led Soler to argue that its dispute
with Mitsubishi was inarbitrable for reasons of public policy. The
district court ordered the arbitration of all claims and counterclaims between the parties. In issuing its order to compel arbitration, the court relied principally on the Scherk doctrine: disputes
not ordinarily arbitrable under domestic law could be submitted
to arbitration if they arose pursuant to an international contract.
On appeal, the critical issue centered on the arbitrability of the
antitrust claims.
Using a studied and intricate pattern of reasoning, the United
States First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
holding on the arbitrability question. 1 In the appellate court's
view, domestic decisional law had created an antitrust exception
to arbitrability. This exception had gained unanimous judicial acceptance and support, indicating that the inarbitrability of antitrust claims was a "solid and sound doctrine." 32 The court of appeals relied primarily on the doctrine the Second Circuit
elaborated in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P.Maguire
& Co. 33 which was the source of the antitrust exception to arbitrability. Indeed, a number of persuasive reasons existed for ex30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
31. 723 F.2d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983). For a commentary on the opinion, see
Recent Developments, Arbitration: Public Policy Exception To Arbitration of
Antitrust Issues, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427 (1984). See also Recent Decisions, Arbitration: TransnationalAntitrust Claims Are Nonarbitrable Under the Federal Arbitration Act and Article I1(1) of the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741
(1984).
32. 723 F.2d at 163.
33. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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empting antitrust matters from the reach of arbitral jurisdiction.
First, the importance of antitrust regulation to the viability of a
free economy supported the judiciary's privileged adjudicatory
position in regard to antitrust matters.34 Second, contracts that
give rise to antitrust disputes usually are adhesion contracts. The
forum selection provisions in such contracts, like agreements to
arbitrate, therefore, would not satisfy the mutuality principle.3
Third, the volume of discovery and other procedural complications normally associated with antitrust litigation are ill-suited
for arbitral adjudication." Finally, arbitrators, who usually are
drawn from the ranks of the business community, should not be
allowed to decide issues that simultaneously implicate the central
interests of that community and a larger public interest.
Persuasive reasons justified the extension of the antitrust exception to international matters. Arbitrators who are foreign nationals probably would have some resistance to and special difficulty in ruling upon antitrust claims.3 7 If restricted to a purely
domestic context, parties, in an effort to avoid the applicable regulations, might fabricate artificial international dealings, thereby
shielding themselves from the reach of the law and making the
enforcement of antitrust provisions more onerous, if not
impossible:
In an increasingly interdependent and interrelated commercial
world, where the multinational corporation with ties to several
countries is becoming more prevalent,. . . the insulation of agreements with some international coloration from the antitrust exception would go far to limit it to the most minor and insignificant of
business dealings. Indeed, suppliers and sellers could achieve immunity from antitrust law threats and sanctions by the simple expedient of co-opting some foreign or international entity into the
38
arrangement.
According to the appellate court, apprehensions concerning the
destabilization of transnational dealings through unfair surprise
by raising antitrust claims were ill-founded. Anti-monopolistic
regulations increasingly were becoming a staple of foreign legisla-

34. See id. at 826-27.
35.
36.

See id. at 827.
See id.

37. 723 F.2d at 162.
38. Id. at 163.
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tion and an acknowledged factor in transnational commerce. 39
The court further found that its application of the antitrust exception to the international context was consistent with the aims
and objectives of the New York Arbitration Convention and the
Scherk holding, because its application struck a balance between
"deeply felt national policies" and "the desire to facilitate international arbitration. ' 40 The court reasoned that "unanimous judicial precedent for a decade and a half" and "a multiplicity of
solid reasons that lose no pertinence or weight in an international
context" 41 mandated the inarbitrability of antitrust claims and
the concomitant restriction upon the scope of international arbitral dispute resolution.
V.

ASSESSING THE APPELLATE REASONING

The measured balance of the First Circuit Court of Appeals'
reasoning in Mitsubishi made its determination convincing. Without detracting from the achievements embodied in the New York
Arbitration Convention and the Scherk holding, the court
adroitly drew an identifiable boundary between national concerns
and the development of international arbitral adjudication. The
ruling prevented the interchange between national and international law from degenerating into a confusing and boundless form
of symbiosis, and created a foundation for establishing a healthy
relationship of mutual interdependence in which separable identities could be maintained fully.
In effect, the court created a necessary limit on entirely justifiable grounds. The weight of history and precedent, the experience
with extraterritoriality, and the cardinal importance of antitrust
regulation in the scheme of United States political and economic
ideology supported the gravamen of the determination. Even the
most strident and inflexible advocates of arbitral internationalism
must have recognized the wisdom of the court's logic and rationality or at least should not have perceived it as a principled threat
to the systemic integrity of the arbitral process. The position that
antitrust matters were an imperative part of United States domestic public policy, even when compared to the strong policy interest in transnational commercial activity, should not have of-

39. Id.
40. Id. at 164.
41.

Id.
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fended or surprised anyone.
VI.

THE ORACULAR INJUNCTIVE REAFFIRMED

The question of antitrust arbitrability received a very different
disposition at the hands of the United States Supreme Court.4 2 In
reversing the appellate ruling in Mitsubishi, the Court reaffirmed
its unequivocal internationalist orientation on the subject of arbitration, subordinating the public interest in antitrust regulations
to the overarching federal policy favoring recourse to arbitration.
The Court also outlined a methodology of analysis for application
in international arbitration cases, and generally expressed a
strong confidence in and support for alternative dispute resolution. In each segment of its reasoning, the Court anchored its determination in a legislative text, giving the impression that the
Court was acting merely as the mouthpiece of an announced and
settled congressional intent.
A.

The Methodology

The critical considerations in assessing litigation on arbitration
center on determining whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; if a valid agreement is found, whether that agreement covers
the dispute in question; and, finally, when a valid agreement covers the controversy, whether external systemic considerations, for
example, whether the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable,
prohibit the recourse to arbitration." In the Supreme Court's
view in Mitsubishi, in keeping with the pervasive United States
judicial approach to arbitral matters, "a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration" must inform the application
44
and interpretation of federal law on the subject of arbitrability.
While all arbitration agreements should be examined for possible
fraud or duress, in the Court's view, no reason exists to deviate
from the normally "hospitable" consideration of the arbitrability
45
question.

42.
43.
44.
Corp.,
45.

Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3346 (1985).
Id. at 3353-55.
Id. at 3354 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
Id. at 3354-55.
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B. Statutory Rights
The Mitsubishi Court envisioned the question of the arbitrability of statutorily-conferred rights not from the perspective
of the enabling legislation, but pursuant to the congressional policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act. 6 Viewing the language consecrating the validity of arbitration agreements as
"[t]he Act's centerpiece provision, ' 47 the Court stated that the
Federal Arbitration Act could not be construed to contain a "presumption against arbitration of statutory claims. '48 Rather, the
substance of the Act and its judicial construction yielded a "'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' "9

underwrit-

ten by the recognition of the principle of contractual autonomy,
namely "a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements." 50 Accordingly, as the Court had determined in previous opinions, the intent Congress manifested in the
express language of the Arbitration Act dictated that the courts
"rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."' In ruling upon arbitration cases, a clear legislative policy supporting the validity of
arbitration agreements therefore bound the federal judiciary; any
presumption that could be gleaned from the statutory language
would favor rather than constrain the recourse to arbitration.
Although no basis existed for creating a presumption against
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, an express legislative
mandate in the applicable statute excluding the recourse to arbitration would bind the courts. In such circumstances, Congress
created an exception to its own policy favoring arbitration. In the
absence of unequivocal legislative intent, parties are free, pursuant to their contractual discretion, to forego judicial remedies; in
so doing, they do not divest themselves of statutorily-created
rights, but rather opt for a form of remedial recourse for vindicating those rights that better suits their circumstances. 52 Accordingly, an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims can be defeated
46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982).
47. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3353.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 3354 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238,
1243 (1985)).
52. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
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only if Congress has determined that the courts are the exclusive
forum in which to remedy alleged grievances:
Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to
it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Nothing, in the meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory
claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate. 3
Presumably, although not absolutely clear from the opinion,
the Mitsubishi Court's reasoning could have equal force in both
domestic and international cases. Although. the Court ultimately
rejects the reasoning in American Safety that "the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of
the claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust claims. . . inappropriate for arbitration, 54 the Court states

that its refusal to apply that reasoning in international matters
does not necessarily undo the effectiveness of the rule in the domestic context: "We find it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy
of the American Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions." 5 The open-ended character of the statement and the qualified language in the holding
which refers to the dichotomy between domestic and international determinations ("even assuming that a contrary result
would be forthcoming in a domestic context"),56 however, generate doubts as to the continued strength and vitality of the American Safety exception in domestic matters.
The conditional tenor of the language, its contrast to the more
emphatic distinction in Scherk between matters domestic and international, and the insistence that inarbitrability requires a congressional intent to make judicial adjudication an exclusive remedy suggest that the Court may believe that the rule it articulates
for international commercial matters is equally applicable to domestic transactions. Such a result would certainly be in accordance with the Court's concern about the systemic burden of protracted litigation and its general position on alternative dispute
resolution.

53.

Id.

54. 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (1968) (cited at 105 S. Ct. 3355).
55. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.

56. Id.
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C. The Central Issue
The preliminary points of analysis regarding the tenor of the
federal policy on arbitration and the arbitrability of statutory
claims establish the context for consideration of the principal issue: whether the antitrust exception to arbitrability articulated in
American Safety should be integrated into the United States judicial doctrine applying to international commercial arbitration.
Given the substance of the Court's preliminary statements, the
die already had been cast. The Court's vigorous, nearly unqualified internationalist attitude, faithful to its disposition in Scherk,
and its burgeoning support for and confidence in alternative dispute resolution are the linchpin tenets of its reassessment of the
policy status of antitrust disputes and the conclusion that the domestic antitrust exception to arbitrability should be excluded
from application in the context of international transactions.
The Mitsubishi Court's allegiance to the Scherk doctrine is unequivocal and its internationalist orientation unmistakable:
As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ..

., we

conclude that concerns

of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement [to arbitrate],
a contrary result would be forthcoming in a
even assuming that
57
domestic context.

The Court in effect reiterates its view that choice-of-law and jurisdictional parochialism are outmoded and counterproductive to
the interests of the United States, implying even more forcefully
that its attitude is a product of legislative intent and that the
judiciary's mission is to translate this intent into a policy on private international law matters.
The central tenet of that policy, which gained considerable impetus from the incorporation of the New York Arbitration Convention into United States law (making the "emphatic federal
policy" favoring arbitration apply "with special force in the field
of international commerce"), 58 began with the Bremen doctrine
on forum-selection clauses (fostering the "enforcement of freely
negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions"),59 and at57. Id.
58. Id. at 3357.
59. Id. at 3356.
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tained substantial force with the Scherk doctrine on international
commerce and arbitration (eschewing "a provincial solicitude for
the jurisdiction of domestic fora").6 0 The policy now boasts of the
Mitsubishi exemption of antitrust matters from the defense of inarbitrability. Perhaps the costly lessons of political history regarding isolationism, the decline of United States economic hegemony in world markets, or the more disinterested juridical
disposition not to thwart the operation of a creative force in establishing transnational order and stability motivated the Court's
choice of direction and objectives. Whatever the motivation, the
essential message is clear: domestically nurtured concerns should
not be allowed to impede the emerging transnational consensus
on commercial arbitral dispute resolution.
The Court responded to the policy concerns articulated in
American Safety by expressing strong confidence in the viability
of arbitral dispute resolution.6 1 The fear that duress or unfair
bargaining advantage would taint arbitration agreements contained in contracts giving rise to antitrust claims is a purely abstract concern that needs to be buttressed by a specific showing
in order to defeat the recourse to arbitration. The potential for
antitrust claims to generate protracted litigation and staggeringly
complex evidentiary matters are not a deterrent to arbitration.
Even those courts that endorsed the American Safety doctrine
subscribe to the view that parties can invoke arbitration once an
antitrust dispute has arisen. Moreover, the submission of antitrust claims to arbitration might transform the character of such
litigation and lead to economical and expeditious proceedings
that might better serve the parties and interests involved. "In any
event, adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of
arbitration.

6' 2

The more widespread adoption of antitrust regulations, the
parties' interest in selecting able and knowledgeable arbitrators,
the business community's stake in economic regulations, and the
experience of having dealt with problems of interpreting and applying foreign law63 point to the inevitable conclusion: "There is
no reason to assume . . . that international arbitration will not

provide an adequate mechanism [for the resolution of antitrust
60. Id.

61. Id. at 3357.
62. Id. at 3357.
63. Id. at 3357-58.
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disputes]. ' e Moreover, private parties have considerable discretion whether to file or settle a domestic antitrust claim. Parties to
an international transaction, given the uncertainty of transnational dispute resolution, are entitled to similar discretion - the
right to provide for a procedure by which to resolve potential antitrust controversies. Finally, evasion of national law should not
be a concern; international arbitrators empowered to rule upon
antitrust disputes should resolve the claims 5pursuant to the national law upon which the claims are based.

D. An Appraisal of the Consequences
The various rationales proffered by the Mitsubishi Court for its
minimization of the significance of antitrust claims certainly will
have foreseeable consequences and, in all likelihood, will have unintended consequences on transnational commercial practice and
the future development of the international commercial arbitration process. Given the Court's holding, most, if not all, international contracts will now contain provisions specifying that eventual antitrust claims will be submitted to arbitration. The quest
for neutrality and self-determination in transnational commercial
dealings makes such a development nearly inevitable.
Ingenious drafting techniques designed to avoid problematic
laws are likely to generate significant difficulties. What result
might apply under the Mitsubishi doctrine if the parties agree
that antitrust claims are to be resolved pursuant to Japanese,
West German, or EEC law rather than the United States antitrust regulations? The predictable lack of uniformity among the
various national and regional laws could allow parties to escape
the reach of a vital, but unfavorable, United States provision.
What if the patties confect their own antitrust laws and refer the
resolution of any future claim to those provisions? Considerable
confusion also may arise when a third party alleges that an international contract between two other parties violates a Sherman
Act provision and brings an action before a United States federal
6
court based on the Alcoa interests test.1
If an agreement to arbi-

64. Id. at 3359.
65. Id.
66. The test espoused by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d'Cir. 1945), applies to the jurisdic-

tional reach of the Sherman Act to conduct outside of the United States:
Judge Hand reasoned that agreements made outside of the United States
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trate antitrust claims exists, courts probably would not deem it
binding on a third party. In these circumstances, allowing for the
national judicial resolution of the claims could defeat the spirit of
self-determination implied in the Mitsubishi holding. It seems, in
fact, that an intractable conflict may exist between the policy
objectives stated in Alcoa and those applying to international arbitral dispute resolution under Mitsubishi.
The Court's ruling in Mitsubishi also may generate a wave of
unanticipated activity in the centers of international arbitration.
Allowing the international arbitral process to function with little
or no national restraint places the burden of definition on the
process itself. Arguably, this is where the burden should be
lodged, although the integration of this new area of responsibility
may tax the existing process to the point of dismantling its established patterns and compromising its viability. If parties actually
submit antitrust claims to arbitration on a regular basis, a special
corps of arbitrators with the required expertise may need to be
constituted and new procedural rules tailored to the anatomy of
antitrust adjudication devised. Such adjudication might further
require the creation of a special body of international arbitral law
and the adoption of court-like rules of binding precedent.6 7 Unlike other disputes that may arise in the context of commercial
transactions (for example, patent infringement questions which
now are arbitrable under United States law), antitrust disputes
not only are potentially complex and can raise choice-of-law difficulties, but they also involve vital and controversial matters that
go to the core of political and public interest considerations.
E.

Abating Concerns Through a Merits Review?

The Court attempts to minimize the implications of Mitsubishi
by noting that international arbitral awards containing antitrust

which restrain trade or commerce within the United States have the same
effect as similar agreements entered into within our borders. Since, any
state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends, he concluded that Congress did intend to apply the Act to conduct abroad so long as the intended effect of that conduct is prohibited by the Act.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1979)
(footnote omitted) (quoting from Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 443).
67. Accord Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 603-05.

284

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19.265

rulings could be denied enforcement under the public policy exception of the New York Arbitration Convention."' The intent
here is to provide a mechanism by which United States courts
could supervise the adjudication of antitrust claims by international arbitrators. As the Court admits, such an antidote to an
expansive concept of arbitrability requires a form of merits review.0 9 The elimination of a review on the merits, however, has
been a focal point of the history of the law of arbitration and
instrumental to the development of the systemic integrity of the
70
process.
Dismantling the English system of judicial supervision of the
merits of arbitral awards took years.71 Reintroducing it in United
States law for whatever reason would be a step backward. Moreover, under the New York Arbitration Convention, the public policy exception is meant to be interpreted restrictively and to involve only a facial scrutiny of awards.72 Linking the public policy
exception to a merits review of awards involving the disposition of
antitrust claims would change the entire complexion of the
ground and certainly would confound the consistency of its previous application. Although most national courts have construed
the 'provision narrowly - for example, one United States federal
court held that only a breach of "the Forum state's most basic
notions of morality and justice ' 73 would trigger the public policy
exception to enforcement - the inclusion of antitrust considerations might lead to a reordering of United States judicial priorities in enforcement (at least among some United States federal
courts), eventually clouding a formerly limpid international standard and policy. The possibility also exists that a practice of merits review would require the rendering of reasoned awards.
Whatever the advantages of such a practice, 4 the longstanding
approach has been to render determinations without stating
reasons.
The Court gives some recognition to these concerns, stating
that "the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive
68. 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
69. Id.
70. See Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 579-86.
71. See supra note 4.
72. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

73. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci~t G6n6rale de L'Industrie
Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
74. See Carbonneau, supra note 21.
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review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal. ...."7
The central problem, of course, resides in defining "minimal."
The Court does provide some guidance on this question, declaring
that a "minimal" merits review of antitrust arbitral awards
"would not require intrusive inquiry" and would be limited to ascertaining whether "the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust
claims and actually decided them.

76

In practical terms, what ap-

peared to be an enterprise fraught with peril turns out to be simply another exercise in the fabrication of straw limitations. Apparently, the Court is contemplating nothing more than a
mechanical, pro forma inspection of the surface content of awards
- a very far cry indeed from a judicial consideration of the merits. Although the defined standard has the great virtue of falling
within the consensus on nonmerits review, it operates as a ploy, a
meaningless token by which to give the semblance of protection
to national interests where no such safeguard in fact exists.
F. The "Prospective Waiver" Example
The Court gives an example of circumstances in which the proposed standard of review and what remains of the inarbitrability
defense might engender a denial of enforcement when antitrust
claims are involved In circumstances in which "choice-of-forum
and choice-of-law clauses operate in tandem as a prospective
waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning
the agreement as against public policy.

77

Although technically

the reasoning seems to apply to the question of the validity of an
arbitration agreement, it should have equal force in and appears
more germane to an enforcement action.
Moreover, the Court's reference to the word "agreement" is
ambiguous. Rather than designating the arbitration agreement, it
might refer to the principal contract. In these circumstances, the
invalidation would not be linked to the regulatory framework of
the New York Convention, but rather would pertain to the
Court's general authority as a court of law. The Convention regulates international arbitration agreements and awards, not international contracts. Interpreting "agreement" to refer to the prin-

75. 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
76. Id.
77. Id. n.19.
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cipal contract, however, is unlikely since the arbitration
agreement, despite the invalidation of the principal contract, still
would be effective under the separability doctrine.78 This would
permit arbitral proceedings to take place for disputes arising from
the nullity of the principal contract.7 9 The intent of the Court
appears to be, however, to define circumstances in which the
presence of antitrust claims might defeat the recourse to arbitration itself. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that "agreement"
refers to the arbitration agreement and not the principal contract.
The ambiguity aside, the Court's "prospective waiver" ruling is
objectionable on a number of grounds. Finding that an arbitration agreement is invalid because the principal contract refers to
a governing law that lacks antitrust provisions contravenes a
number of consecrated principles of the federal policy on international commercial arbitration: the policy favoring the recourse to
arbitration, the principles of party autonomy and self-determination in contracts (especially international ones), and the need to
avoid parochial determinations and to recognize the special requirements of transnational commerce. The Scherk perspective
compels the conclusion that experienced international merchants,
aware of the importance of commercial competition, should be allowed to establish their own regulatory scheme if they so choose.
The "dicey atmosphere"80 of international commerce cannot tolerate easily the lack of predictability that the invalidation of arbitration agreements and choice-of-law clauses for reasons of the
United States interest in antitrust enforcement would create.
Moreover, the substantive overlap between the inarbitrability
defense and the public policy exception8 1 makes it difficult to understand how the subject matter of an agreement could be arbitrable, yet at the same time violate the public policy exception by
its substance. There is here at least a facial contradiction: either
antitrust claims are arbitrable or public policy requires their resolution by courts of law. Moreover, the controlling federal law, as
78. For a discussion of the separability doctrine, see G. WILNER, supra note
1, §§ 8:01-:02. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.

395 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 15, 1966, Cour d'appel, Orleans, (1966) D.S.
Jur. 340. See also The Elaborationof a French Court Doctrineon International
Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity, 55
TUL. L. Rnv. 1, 36-40 (1980).
80. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517.
81. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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informed by the provisions of the New York Arbitration Convention, does not recognize specifically the possibility of invalidating
an arbitration agreement on a public policy basis. An agreement
is invalid if it relates to a subject matter that cannot be referred
to arbitration (inarbitrability)8 2 or if it is "null and void, inoperable or incapable of being performed"8 3 (referring here to the ordinary principles of contract law: lack of capacity, fraud, duress)., 4 Although arguably the words "null and void" could refer
to public policy violations, current doctrine and the legislative
85
history of the Convention do not justify this interpretation.
In its "prospective waiver" example, the Supreme Court misuses the public policy exception; the rule that should emerge from
the Court's example is that, when the choice-of-law and forum
provisions of an international contract operate to divest a party of
its right to bring an antitrust claim, the arbitration clause contained in that contract will be invalidated because it applies to an
inarbitrable subject matter. Although this reasoning may be tortuous, it does have the advantage of maintaining the integrity of
the Convention's regulatory framework. The legal fiction (a valid
arbitration agreement is invalid) and logical inconsistency (antitrust claims are arbitrable provided they in fact are arbitrated),
however, are yet another illustration of how difficult affording any
protection to fundamental national interests under the Mitsubishi doctrine of arbitrability may be. In effect, the relief contemplated under the "prospective waiver" example cannot be integrated into the Convention's regulatory framework except
through the most arcane and intellectually suspect reasoning.
The Court's proposed standard of review is simply too diffuse
to account for the complex situations that can be anticipated and,
therefore, is unlikely to trigger either the inarbitrability defense
or the public policy exception. For example, the parties' agreement might refer to a governing law, first, that contains no antitrust provisions whatsoever or, second, that differs from its
United States counterpart in that it does not recognize the alleged conduct as violative or does not contain a similar or parallel
remedial mechanism. Even when United States or a functionally
82.

See New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(1).

83. See id., art. 11(3).
84. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 151-61.
85. See id. See also Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An
Examindtion of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981).
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equivalent law applies, international arbitrators might not apply
that law or might interpret it according to international commercial customs and usages. Such complicated variations would be
impossible to detect under a superficial level of scrutiny. In fact,
the complexity of antitrust determinations, especially those involving international actors and conduct, simply does not lend itself to facile, token review.
The Court's "prospective waiver" example and its proposed
minimal merits review, in effect, have brought the entire arbitrability question back nearly full circle, modifying to some extent the original rule: antitrust issues are arbitrable and agreements stipulating the arbitration of such matters are valid in the
international context, provided a law that contains a statutory
basis for lodging antitrust claims governs the contract and the
resolution of contractual disputes. Obviously, such a decisional
law rule could be used easily to thwart international arbitrations:
merely alleging antitrust violations when the contract refers exclusively to a governing law that lacks antitrust regulations could
undermine the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement, and an
award could be denied enforcement if it lacks a ruling on antitrust when a de minimus showing of an alleged antitrust violation
is made at the enforcement stage. Arguably, to avoid enforcement
problems, international arbitrators might conclude that United
States antitrust provisions apply as a matter of law to the arbitration of any antitrust claim if the law governing the merits of the
arbitration does not contain antitrust provisions. Moreover, international contracts might include a special arbitral provision specifying an appropriate governing law for potential antitrust matters
in the event that the law of the contract lacks the relevant regulations. Such foreseeable results would rub coarsely against the
grain of the Scherk-Mitsubishi doctrine. What was intended as a
"hands-off" approach would become substantially intrusive.
G.

The Dissent

In keeping with the pattern established in Scherk, a vigorous, if
not vehement, dissent follows the majority opinion in Mitsub8
ishi.88 Denouncing the result in the majority opinion as "folly," 7
86. 105 S. Ct. at 3361.
87. Id. at 3374. For an intermediating view of how the competing policy interests in antitrust regulation and arbitration might be reconciled, see Allison,
Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need For Enhanced Ac-
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the dissent persuasively points to a number of fundamental weaknesses in the majority reasoning, namely, its exaggerated and idealistic internationalism and its failure to give sufficient considbration to the public law nature of antitrust regulation. In language
reminiscent of Justice Douglas' reference to the "'international
contract' talisman," 88 Justice Stevens states:
The Court's repeated incantation of the high ideals of "international arbitration" creates the impression that this case involves
the fate of an institution designed to implement a formula for
world peace. But just as it is improper to subordinate the public
interest in enforcement of antitrust policy to the private interest in
resolving commercial disputes, so it is equally unwise to allow a
vision of world unity to distort the importance of the selection of
the proper forum for resolving this dispute. Like any other mechanism for resolving controversies, international arbitration will only
succeed if it is realistically limited to tasks it is capable of performing well - the prompt and inexpensive resolution of essentially
contractual disputes between commercial partners. As for matters
involving the political passions and the fundamental interests of
nations, even the multilateral convention adopted under the auspices of the United Nations recognizes that private international
arbitration is incapable of achieving satisfactory results.8 9
In addition to raising technical objections centering upon the
fact that Chrysler was a party to the antitrust dispute but was
not included in the arbitration," the dissent emphasized that antitrust controversies exceed the competence and scope of private
arbitral adjudication. 91 Aligning itself with the Alcoa decisional
law, it stated that the United States antitrust laws are the creed
of Western capitalistic democracies. Viewing the congressional
mandate underlying the antitrust provisions as implying permis-

sible recourse to arbitration rather than judicial remedies is an
abuse of interpretative discretion. Their application generates is-

sues of significant political and social moment for the public at
large, requiring open debate and consideration before tribunals
invested with public jurisdictional authority. Arbitral fora are inappropriate dispute resolution mechanisms since they are fash-

commodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1986).
88. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3374 (footnote omitted).
90. See id. at 3362-63.
91. Id. at 3374.
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ioned to grapple with private controversies of a commercial character and allow only limited possibilities for review. Moreover, the
antitrust dispute in Mitsubishi was incidental to the specifically
contractual controversy. Finally, by recognizing expressly the inarbitrability defense, the New York Arbitration Convention itself
acknowledges that some domestic concerns remain vital and controlling - despite the policy favoring international arbitral dis92
pute resolution.
VII.

IN THE AFTERMATH

Mitsubishi already has achieved a substantial degree of recognition and influence in United States adjudication pertaining to
both domestic and international arbitral law. In domestic cases,
Mitsubishi serves as authority for consolidating the principal decisional law advances. These advances include the submissibility
of statutorily-based claims to arbitration, provided the controlling
statute does not mandate exclusive judicial remedies. 3 Even
when the statute provides for exclusive judicial resolution, the
federal law on arbitrability may override it.94 Along with Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,95 Mitsubishi has been influential in
persuading federal district courts that domestic claims arising

92. Id.
93.

See Good(e) Business Systems, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 614 F. Supp. 428

(D.C. Wis. 1985) (provisions of Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law purporting to
limit arbitrability of fair dealership claims involving agreements that would oth-

erwise be within the purview of the Federal Arbitration Act conflicted with federal law and were preempted by the Supremacy Clause); Protane Gas Co. of

Puerto Rico v. Sony Consumer Products Co., 613 F. Supp. 215 (D.P.R. 1985)
(Puerto Rican statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10 § 278b-2 (Supp. 1985) which provides that any agreement to arbitrate out of Puerto Rico or subject to foreign
laws any controversy arising out of a distribution contract is null and void, violating the Supremacy Clause and the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act).
See also Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 623 F. Supp. 912

(D.P.R. 1985).
94. See cases cited supra note 93.
95. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985). For commentary on this opinion, see Comment,
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd: The Unraveling of the Intertwining Doc-

trine, 62 DEN. U. L. REv. 789 (1985); Note, Investor-Broker Arbitration Agreements: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 101 (1985). See
also, Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3
(1986); Schaller & Schaller, Applying the Wilko Doctrine's Anti-Arbitration
Policy In Commodities Fraud Cases, 61 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 515 (1985).
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under the Securities Act of 193498 are arbitrable. 7 According to
one court, "[t]he trend in Supreme Court rulings is toward arbitrability in an increasing number of cases." 98 The critical determiners of this trend are borrowed directly from Mitsubishi: the
1934 Act does not contain a specific congressional intent to exclude the arbitration of claims; by agreeing to arbitration, the
parties do not divest themselves of their substantive statutory
rights.9 9 Quoting from Mitsubishi, the courts have held that the
parties merely opted for a different remedial framework,
"trad[ing] the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." 10 0 The emphasis on the federal policy favoring arbitration, a central tenet of the Mitsubishi doctrine, also permeates
the recent cases.10 1
The SEDCO litigation 0 2 serves as a transition between the domestic and international cases. The Fifth Circuit relied on Mitsubishi's internationalist tenor to compel arbitration in a maritime transaction.1 03 The court of appeals further noted that the

Supreme Court's latest pronouncements in domestic arbitral mat-

ters indicated increasing judicial support for arbitration. 0 4 The

96. 15 U.S.C. 78a-78kk (1982).
97. See Moncrieff v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 623 F.
Supp. 1005 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622
F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Harvey Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 642 (D.C. Mass. 1985). Accord Green v. Shearson Leaman/American Express, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Michael Erlbaum v. Prudential-Bache Securities, No. 84-5541 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1985). Contra Lamb v. Legg
Mason Wood Walker, Inc., No. 85-1316 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1985).
98. See Moncrieff, 623 F. Supp. at 1008.
99. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Baker Industries, Inc., 779 F.2d 26 (8th Cir.
1985); Alfred Ferreri v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 427 (E.D.
Pa. 1985). For a discussion of the federalism implications of the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on arbitration, see Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. Ruv. 1305 (1985); Note,
Preemption of State Law Under the FederalArbitration Act, 15 BALT. L. REV.
129 (1985). For a brilliant synthesis and expansion on this topic, see Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881
(1986).
102. SEDCO, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
103. Id. at 1148.
104. Id. at 1147-48.
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illustration for this support came in the form of what might be
called "reverse inarbitrability," namely, the rejection of the intertwining doctrine 0 5 that required federal courts to maintain jurisdiction over an action involving an agreement to arbitrate when
the action involved several claims, at least one of which fell
within exclusive federal jurisdiction. The purpose of the doctrine
was to prevent arbitrators from inserting themselves into areas
that Congress had reserved for exclusive federal court jurisdiction. In Dean Witter Reynolds, the Supreme Court undid this restraint on arbitration, holding that "the relevant federal law [the
Federal Arbitration Act] requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." 0 8 The demise
of the intertwining doctrine further undermines the usually privileged status of public policy matters, enhancing the systemic autonomy and stature of arbitral dispute resolution.
Mitsubishi also has had a vital influence specifically in international litigation where the case serves as authority for the now
well-settled tenets of the Supreme Court's doctrine toward private international law matters: to "strongly favor enforcement of
forum selection clauses in international contracts" and to advance
"the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution[,] . . . [a] policy [that] applies with special force in the field
of international commerce. 10 7 For example, Mitsubishi figures
prominently in a recent litigation0 8 centering on allegations of
antitrust violations in a distributorship arrangement involving a
foreign party, several United States companies, and an arbitration agreement providing for arbitration in Houston, Texas.
While the federal district court perceptively expressed doubt that
the rejection of the American Safety doctrine in Mitsubishi was

105.. See Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. M/V WARSCHAU, 731 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.
1984).
106. Dean Witter Reynolds, 105 S. Ct. at 1242 (emphasis in original) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20
(1983)).
107. Mitsubishi, 105 S.Ct. at 3346, 3356-57. See also, Karlberg European
Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Josef Kratz Vertriebsgesellschaft MBH, 618 F. Supp. 344,
347 (D.C. 11. 1985); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bol., 615 F. Supp. 92
(D.D.C. 1985); Perkin Elmer v. Trans Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L., 107
F.R.D. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Quinn v. CGR, 48 B.R. 367 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
108. High Strength Steel, Inc. v. Svenskt Stal Aktiebolag, No. 85 C 1070
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1985).
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restricted to international arbitral matters, 1 9 the court endorsed

without question the principle of the arbitrability of antitrust
claims arising in the context of a transnational commercial venture. The real difficulty in the case resided in determining
whether the transaction in question, involving only a single foreign party and having a significant United States nexus, was "sufficiently international in character to come within the holding of
Mitsubishi."1 10
The court determined that it was, applying the Supreme
Court's rather lax definition of international contracts:
The cases discussed by the Supreme Court as demonstrative of the
requisite international transaction context clearly indicate that if
one party to a contract is a foreign corporation and the contract
involves some type of international transaction, then the parties'
choice of forum clause will be enforced even when federal antitrust
claims are at issue.'11

Coupled with a broad arbitrability mandate, this essentially tautological definition of what constitutes an international transac-

tion should expand greatly the scope and range of arbitral dispute
resolution both within and at the periphery of transnational commerce. In any event, the lower federal courts, for good or in,
clearly have heard and understood the directive that the process
of international commercial arbitration should go forward
unimpeded.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers

Inc.,112 is the most disturbing opinion to follow in the aftermath

of Mitsubishi. The opinion confirms many of the apprehensions
that the breadth of the holding generated. In Chemtex Fibers, a

109. Id. n.2.
110. Id.
111. Id. See also Delaume, What Is an International Contract? An American and a Gallic Dilemma, 28 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 258 (1979).
112. 617 F. Supp. 55 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). There is currently a sharp division of
opinion among the federal courts as to whether RICO claims are arbitrable.
Along with Chemtex, another court has held RICO claims to be arbitrable. See
West v. Drexel, Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
Other federal courts, however, have held that RICO claims are inarbitrable. See
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986);
American Concept v. Irsay, No. 84 C 10026 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1985); Webb v. R.
Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1985). Finally, one federal court
has held domestic antitrust disputes to be arbitrable. See Genna v. Lady Foot
Int'l, CA. 85-4372 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 28, 1986).
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Philippine bank, which had acted as a guarantor of loans made by
the United States company Chemtex to a Philippine concern,
brought an action before the federal district court in New York,
alleging that Chemtex had engaged in fraud and committed a
civil violation of RICO. Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the
loan agreement, Chemtex moved for an order to compel arbitration of the parties' differences. Precedent existed to support the
position that RICO claims were inarbitrable; prior cases had analogized them to antitrust claims as matters involving "substantial
public and community interests, the safeguarding of which Congress did not intend to leave in the hands of arbitrators," a status
that exempted them from the purview of the Federal Arbitration
Act and its "strong preference for arbitration over litigation."113
Relying on Mitsubishi, the federal district court issued an order
to compel arbitration, holding that the RICO claims were arbitrable. In the court's view, if the domestic interest in antitrust regulation were not strong enough to warrant a finding of inarbitrability, the policy underlying the federal anti-racketeering
statute, "arguably a great deal less strong" 114 than the interest in
the enforcement of United States antitrust principles, could not
prevent the recourse to international arbitration. "In view of the
recent guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi,
and taking into account the preference for arbitration in the international commercial context established by prior decisions,
this Court is satisfied that plaintiff's RICO claims are arbitrable
under the clause contained in the loan agreement."1 15
In applying the blanket mandate of the Mitsubishi holding, the
court made reference to the minimal merits review standard and
indirectly expounded upon the Supreme Court's "prospective
waiver" example. 1 6 Seeing the argument as a misunderstanding
of the provision, the district court criticized counsel's allegation
that the New York Arbitration Convention's public policy exception to enforcement empowered United States courts to hold
RICO claims "not arbitrable as contrary to public policy. 1 17 The

113. Chemtex, 617 F. Supp. at 56 (referring to S.A. Mineracao da TrindadeSamitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 745 F.2d 190 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id.
116. Id. n.12.
117. Id.
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court correctly stated that the public policy exception applies exclusively to enforcement matters, and does not implicate the validity of an arbitration agreement. Further noting the Mitsubishi
Court's ruling regarding the minimal merits review at the enforcement stage, the court concluded that "whatever the permissible
inquiry after conclusion of an arbitration proceeding, it is clear
that the Convention does not contemplate the expression1'18of local
public policy as a barrier to the arbitrability of claims."
The foregoing reasoning indicates how unfortunate and utterly
confusing the implications and ancillary aspects of the Mitsubishi
doctrine may become. The district court's view that the New
York Arbitration Convention does not allow domestic public policy to defeat the arbitrability of disputes appears to contradict
the Supreme Court's assessment of its authority under the Convention in circumstances where the provisions of an international
contract amount to a "prospective waiver" of antitrust rights. Regardless of the justification for its position, the Court would invalidate the agreement by invoking domestic United States public
policy, thereby allowing the latter to act by ricochet as "a barrier
to the arbitrability of claims." In light of the practice surrounding
the Convention, its legislative history, and its express language,
the district court is probably correct in attributing a restrictive
role to the public policy exception in such matters.
Also, the district court's failure in Chemtex Fibers to perceive,
or at least acknowledge, the larger conceptual affinity between the
inarbitrability defense and the public policy exception is troublesome. The court's failure reflects judicial confusion and uncertainty about the objective and framework of the Convention.
While they function as separate grounds in the Convention, arbitrability acts as a metaphor for the concept of public policy. Like
the public policy exception, arbitrability serves as an instrument
by which to exempt matters of vital national public importance
from the reach of private adjudication. It has a more specific theoretical content than the public policy conception and applies
broadly to both arbitral agreements and awards, but its substantive mission and purpose under the Convention are much the
same as the public policy exception. In some respects, arbitrability can be viewed as a narrower version of the public policy
exception as applied to arbitration agreements.11 9 The interna118. Id.
119. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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tional consensus favoring arbitration 120 recognizes only technical
objections to the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards
(a lack of capacity, duress, notice, excess of arbitral authority)
and limited substantive barriers (inarbitrability as to the subject
matter of the agreement, and inarbitrability and public policy infringements as to the content of awards). The court's view that
the "Convention does not contemplate the expression of local
public policy as a barrier to the arbitrability of claims,' 1 21 although accurately reflecting the technical pattern of the various
grounds in the Convention, is inaccurate in a larger theoretical
sense since national public policy defines the content of the inarbitrability defense.
Succinctly stated, Chemtex demonstrates that the federal
courts will assume a heightened pace in the march toward a
nearly absolute neutralization of vital national juridical interests
in transnational commercial matters. Given the force and breadth
of Mitsubishi, lower courts will acquiesce passively to the overarching federal policy favoring unfettered internationalism until
they receive more studied guidance from the Supreme Court.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

By holding that antitrust claims are arbitrable, the United
States Supreme Court may have wanted to minimize, if not eliminate, the possibility that dilatory practices could thwart the international arbitral process. Faced with a potentially ruinous contractual relationship and the prospect of arbitration, a
disgruntled party (like Soler) might find that it has no other remedy than postponing the day of reckoning. Raising the possibility
that the entire transaction is illicit because of antitrust violations
at least generates delay and might undermine the arbitration,
staving off the possibility of resolution.
Dilatory practices were common in the early development of arbitral law. Previously, parties who wanted to impede the recourse
to arbitration claimed that the subject matter or other material
aspect of the main contract contravened public policy; the nullity
of the main contract, in turn, rendered the agreement to arbitrate
invalid. The judicial elaboration of the separability doctrine, providing that the agreement to arbitrate was juridically autonomous

120. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
121. Chemtex, 617 F. Supp. at 57 n.12.
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and separable from the main contract, put an end to such claims,
insulating the arbitral process from bad faith challenges. The
mere allegation of the invalidity of the main contract no longer
engenders the divestiture of arbitral jurisdiction; questions of
contractual invalidity are submitted for adjudication to arbitrators, who have the further authority to rule upon matters concerning the principle and scope of their jurisdiction (the
kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine).
The doctrinal reach of the Mitsubishi determination makes it
unlikely that the Supreme Court's reasoning focused upon this
narrower concern. Even if it did, the means the Court used were
entirely disproportionate to the end it meant to achieve. If ridding the arbitral process of potential dilatory practices were the
Court's objective, the combined application of the separability
and kompetenz-kompetenz doctrines easily presents a much less
radical solution-a solution consecrated by past practice. Finally,
as distributorship and franchising agreements often do both domestically and internationally, it seems that the Mitsubishi circumstances did raise genuine antitrust issues concerning vertical
restraints. Although the eventual resolution of such issues is a
matter of speculation centering upon an evolving judicial doctrine, Soler's antitrust claims were not designed, on their face, to
achieve a merely dilatory purpose. They responded to and were
embedded in the factual perimeters of the contractual relationship. The Supreme Court, therefore, was not concerned with dilatory practices and the integrity of the arbitral process, but rather
wanted to affirm the "unbounded" scope of its arbitral
internationalism.
The doctrine that emerges from Mitsubishi is excessive and
does injustice to the domestic interest in public law by minimizing the public policy character of antitrust regulation. The specter of the talisman is becoming all too real: if such fundamental
issues as antitrust matters (and RICO claims) can be submitted
to arbitration, what possible limits could there be to the reach of
arbitrability in the international (and also possibly in the domestic) context? The confusing and potentially dangerous shift of domestic public law concerns to the enforcement stage is likely to be
ineffectual, destined to act as the shadow of a safeguard rather
than a genuine means of protection. The Court's expansive internationalism conjoined to its more recent interest in alternative
dispute resolution led it to envisage the issues raised through the
undifferentiated perspective of pure policy commitment rather
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than a studied analytical outlook. The result borders upon nearly
absolute license rather than the measured rationality of
regulation.
While national court support is indispensable to the furtherance of the international arbitral process and the creation of a
praetorian system of transnational law, the Mitsubishi corollary
to Scherk seems to place the dynamic and fertile interchange in
jeopardy. The Court's rush to eradicate all national legal constraints not only compromises legitimate national concerns, but
also threatens the integrity of international arbitral adjudication
itself, frustrating its normal tendency to seek guidance and appropriate limits from external factors. The Court's failure to acknowledge logical, sensible and necessary restraints countermands
the basic consensus of the New York Arbitration Convention and
moves closer to placing international dispute resolution through
arbitration in a realm of "anational" lawlessness.

